At TecnetOne, we share the latest findings on how two Chinese entities—the Beijing Institute of Electronic Technology Application (BIETA) and its subsidiary Beijing Sanxin Times Technology Co., Ltd. (CIII)—may be closely collaborating with China’s Ministry of State Security (MSS).
According to a new report from Recorded Future, evidence suggests that BIETA and CIII are not simply technology research outfits but key players in developing tools used for cyber-espionage, counterintelligence, and military operations.
BIETA: A “Research Institute” with MSS Connections
Founded in 1983, BIETA presents itself as a research and development center focusing on communications, multimedia processing, information security, and computer applications. However, investigations indicate that several of its members have ties to the MSS.
Four employees—Wu Shizhong, He Dequan, You Xingang, and Zhou Linna—are reported to have previously worked with or maintained links to intelligence officers. BIETA also maintains ties with China’s University of International Relations, an institution known for training MSS personnel.
These connections support the hypothesis that BIETA serves as an institutional front for developing technologies that directly benefit Chinese state intelligence operations.
CIII: Turning Research into Espionage Tools
CIII, BIETA’s subsidiary, has developed specialized software and devices applicable to both forensic research and digital espionage. Its registered products include steganography tools—used to hide information within images, audio, or video—as well as penetration testing programs for networks, cloud platforms, and Internet of Things (IoT) systems.
Recent applications include a mobile phone positioning system capable of identifying, tracking, and even blocking communications inside large venues. This system could also intercept messages and calls from targeted devices.
Recorded Future also notes that CIII holds copyrights for covert communication software and cloud upload tools for services like Baidu Cloud and OneDrive, expanding its potential for clandestine operations.
Learn more: LunaSpy: The Fake Antivirus Spying on Your Phone
How These Technologies Fuel the MSS Machine
China’s Ministry of State Security, the country’s main intelligence and counterespionage agency, coordinates multiple global cyber-espionage campaigns. According to Recorded Future, the capabilities developed by BIETA and CIII may be used directly by the MSS or distributed to other security departments and contractors.
The tools created by these companies range from encrypted communications software to platforms for planning attacks and military operations. Their role resembles that of defense contractors in other countries: designing and supplying advanced technology to support intelligence or defense missions.
In this sense, BIETA and CIII form part of a network of “front” organizations enabling the MSS to operate more discreetly, using civilian structures to conceal military or espionage projects.
Public Evidence and Additional Findings
Recorded Future supports its conclusions with public documentation and digital footprints. On official websites, BIETA describes itself as an R&D institute for multimedia security and special communications, while CIII appears as a developer of network simulation tools, performance testing, and secure data storage.
However, behind these generic descriptions, researchers identified references to infiltration technologies, forensic analysis programs, and communications interception systems.
The report also mentions that BIETA and CIII have purchased equipment and software from foreign cybersecurity companies, suggesting attempts to acquire and adapt international technology for MSS use.
The Broader Context: Digital Espionage and Geopolitical Rivalry
These findings emerge amid rising tensions between China and Western nations over cybersecurity. The United States, the European Union, and several Asian countries have repeatedly accused groups linked to the MSS of cyberattacks.
Such operations blend industrial espionage, intellectual property theft, and surveillance of political or strategic targets. According to analysts, tools developed by BIETA and CIII could enable covert infiltration of critical systems or high-value corporate networks.
For example, using advanced steganography, the MSS could send commands or hidden malware embedded in seemingly harmless images or files—evading even sophisticated antivirus solutions.
Links to Other Cyber-Espionage Operations
The report notes that BIETA and CIII likely do not operate in isolation. Their work appears integrated into a broader ecosystem of companies and research labs tied to Chinese intelligence.
In this setup, BIETA focuses on researching and developing technologies, while CIII acts as the distribution channel, commercializing products usable in both legitimate and covert environments.
This strategy of dividing functions between civilian entities allows Chinese agencies to maintain legal and political distance, reducing the MSS’s direct exposure to international accusations.
Report Conclusions
Recorded Future concludes that BIETA and CIII form part of a network of front organizations supporting the MSS’s cyber operations. Although seemingly private, these companies help develop critical capabilities for digital espionage, covert communications, and technical intelligence gathering.
In short, BIETA and its subsidiary CIII are more than mere tech firms: they are key components of the infrastructure underpinning China’s cyber-intelligence strategy.
You might also be interested in: How to Detect and Remove Spyware Apps on Android
Why This Matters for Businesses and Governments
From a cybersecurity standpoint, this case highlights how difficult it is to distinguish between legitimate technological research and covert development of offensive capabilities.
For international companies, it implies an added risk: technology suppliers or partners may be directly or indirectly involved in state-backed espionage projects. This underscores the need to audit your supply chain and assess the origins of tools or services you use.
At TecnetOne, we recommend proactive security strategies and continuous monitoring—especially when dealing with imported technologies or software handling sensitive data. Transparency, traceability, and independent vendor verification are essential to minimize exposure to state actors.
Conclusion
The case of BIETA and CIII illustrates how modern digital espionage relies on seemingly legitimate structures. In a world where the line between innovation and manipulation is increasingly blurred, protecting your data depends not only on technology but also on constant vigilance and responsible partner management.
At TecnetOne, we help you strengthen your digital defenses, reduce your attack surface, and safeguard your organization against the emerging risks of global cyber-espionage.
